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I. Introduction
In the contemporary world, civil wars produce widespread interna-
tional effects. In the past, limited means of transportation and less so-
phisticated communications permitted at least a partial insulation of
civil wars in places far from the territories of the great powers. Trans-
national interactions were fewer; people's foci of attention were nar-
rower. Thus, popular demands' and identifications2 were more
circumscribed. Scientific and technological advances changed these
conditions. International economic actors used new technology to inte-
grate national economies into larger networks and to obtain informa-
tion about commercial opportunities and risks. Security arrangements
were developed to maintain and expand access to the resources and
markets that modern industrial economies require. These factors have
helped to shape the present world community, which is characterized
by increasingly interrelated social processes and equally intricate polit-
ical and economic interdependence.
As a result, most national decision makers need to consider the po-
tential consequences of any major internal war, wherever located, both
for world institutions and for the other, more immediate communities
with which they identify. Consequently, their responses to such a con-
flict will be molded by expectations3 about future events and desires to
affect future outcomes. In this setting, any decision or non-decision
influences events far from the conflict itself.
Traditional international law regulating participation in civil wars
assumed that nonintervention was a policy both viable and desirable.
Nonintervention as a legal principle seeks prevention of exogenously
sponsored insurrections and isolation of conflicts from external partici-
t J.S.D. Candidate, Yale University. The author dedicates this Comment to the mem-
ory of Harold D. Lasswell, late Ford Foundation Professor of Law, Yale University. The
author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable comments and criticism of W. Michael Reis-
man, Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY 17-19 (1950).
2. Id at 11-12.
3. Id at 21-22.
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pants. These objectives are presumed to facilitate self-determination of
the peoples concerned, minimize destructive violence, and promote
human rights.4 Though nonintervention remains an influential notion
in contemporary law,5 international politics has often ignored its com-
mand. Hegemonic states have unilaterally asserted authoritative doc-
trines to justify interventions in their control areas.
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The civil war in El Salvador invites an examination of issues related
to application of the doctrine of nonintervention, and particularly of
U.S. policy choices on military and other involvement in that conflict.
This Comment appraises the lawfulness and reasonableness of in-
creased U.S. military participation in El Salvador, and contrasts mili-
tary involvement with other modalities of lawful influence.7 The
Comment submits that while foreign governments should respect the
principle of military nonintervention with respect to the conflict, nonin-
tervention should not be interpreted to bar outside actors from attempt-
ing to influence the contestants for power within El Salvador to reach a
peaceful settlement.
Certain important features of the conflict will be examined compre-
hensively. The analysis requires investigation of the main participants
4. The policies referred to in the text are the basic community policies at stake in cases of
intervention. For a discussion of these basic community values, see J. MOORE, LAW AND
THE INDO-CHINA WAR 163-73 (1972); Moore, Toward an 4pplled Theoryfor the Regulation
ofIntervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 3, 18-21 (J. Moore ed.
1974).
5. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CHARTER art. 18; United Nations
General Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Internal Affairs
of States, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965). Such prescriptions are consistent with the fundamental policy of the contemporary
world community, the prohibition of unauthorized coercion, as expressed in U.N. CHARTER
art. 2, para. 4.
On the United States' legal commitment to nonintervention, as well as on past interven-
tion in the western hemisphere, see generally W.E. KANE, CIVIL STRIFE IN LATIN AMERICA:
A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT (1972).
6. "A control area is a domain not necessarily accompanied by authority." H. LASS-
WELL & A. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 257. A hegemonic state exerts supremacy m a control
area. Id For a critical appraisal of the lawfulness of certain unilaterally proclaimed doc-
trines, see Reisman, Critical Defense Zones and International Law: The Reagan Codicil, 76
AM. J. INT'L L. 589 (1982).
The author subscribes to the policy-oriented approach to law developed by H. Lasswell,
M. McDougal, W. Reisman, and associates. A helpful introduction to this approach is Reis-
man & Suzuki, Recognition and Social Change in International Law, in TOWARD WORLD
ORDER AND HUmAN DIGNITY 403 (W. Reisman & B. Weston eds. 1976). See also W. REIS-
MAN, NULLITY AND REVISION 836-58 (1971) (lawfulness and the use of coercion); Reisman,
4 Theory about Law from the Policy Perspective, in LAW AND POLICY 75 (D. Weisstub ed.
1976); McDougal & Reisman, The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Process: How
International Law Is Made, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD Pun. ORD., 249 (1980).
7. Examples of other modalities of lawful influence include diplomacy, propaganda, and
providing or halting economic aid.
326
Vol. 8:325, 1982
Crisis in El Salvador
and their demands, identifications, expectations, and degree of popular
support; the resources controlled by the participants and the role and
importance of outside assistance; the goals and strategies chosen by the
participants; and finally, the probable long-term effects of their actions
on regional socio-political processes. 8 This Comment will examine the
Salvadoran civil war in this context, and recommend policy approaches
compatible with the United Nations Charter, basic documents on
human rights, and regional security agreements. In light of these rec-
ommended policy approaches, the Comment will undertake a critical
examination of the Reagan administration's reactions to events in El
Salvador and of the recent election of delegates to a Constituent As-
sembly, and propose lawful initiatives to achieve the fundamental
objectives of international law in the Salvadoran situation.
II. The Economic Context: A Region in Crisis
Central America is undergoing a severe economic crisis.9 In Costa
Rica, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, per capita income is declining and
reserves of foreign exchange are nearly exhausted. The economies of
Honduras and Guatemala are stagnant I and their balances of pay-
8. This approach differs from rule-oriented analytical frameworks. For examples of the
latter, see Moore, supra note 4, at 24 (recommended standards of appraisal); Farer, Interven-
tion in Civil Wars: .4 Modest Proposal, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 266, 275 (1967) ("flat prohibition
of participation in tactical operations, either openly or through the medium of advisors or
volunteers," as single rule for regulation of intervention); Farer, Harnessing Rogue Ele-
phants: A Short Discourse on Foreign Intervention in Civil Strfe, 82 HARV. L. RaV. 511
(1969). The policy-oriented approach attempts to take into account important features of
the context and to recommend lawful responses, which, in practice, approximate the objec-
tives of international law. For the jurisprudential background of this approach, see McDou-
gal & Lasswell, The Ident fcation and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 Am. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1959); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER (1961); Burke, The Legal Regulation of Minor International Coercion: A Framework
of Inquiry, in 1 TilE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (R. Falk ed. 1968).
9. For the purposes of this Comment, Central America is defined as including the fol-
lowing countries: Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Belize.
The Central American region has about 23 million inhabitants. For background on the
regional economic crisis, see Feinberg, Central Americx No Easy Answers, 59 FOREIGN
AFF. 1121 (1981); CENTRAL AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CRISIS (R.
Feinberg ed. 1982).
10. According to the United Nations Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), the
economies of Honduras and Guatemala stagnated in 1981. Production decreased in El Sal-
vador by nearly 9%, and in Costa Rica by 1.5%. In Nicaragua, however, the gross national
product grew by 6%, though it remains about 20% below the 1977 level. Latin Am. Weekly
Rep., Jan. 8, 1982, at 9. Capital flight is another aspect of the problem. In 1981, approxi-
mately $700 million left Guatemala and $300 million left Honduras. Latin Am. Regional
Rep./Mexico & Cent. Am., Jan. 8, 1982, at 7. See also 1982 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, STA-
TISTICS Y.B. (pts. 1 & 2) 154 (Intl Monetary Fund) (El Salvador data for 1979 and 1980)
[hereinafter STATISTICS Y.B.].
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ments are worsening." All five countries face increasing deficits and
inflation. 12
Three principal causes of the region's economic difficulties may be
identified. First, past strategies of economic development failed in im-
portant respects. Balances of payments did not receive adequate atten-
tion and were allowed to deteriorate. Development institutions in the
public sector were too weak to ensure balanced growth and equitable
distribution of income. Second, external factors contributed to eco-
nomic destabilization. Terms of trade became more unfavorable and
inflation generated from abroad upset price levels. Third, political tur-
moil has caused capital flight, disrupted fiscal management, and, in
some countries, damaged productive capital.
Since about 1960, until this crisis, Central America had experienced
significant economic growth' 3 and increasing integration into the world
economy. 14 The strategy of protected industrialization and export-ori-
ented agriculture, aided by the establishment of the Central American
Common Market, benefited private industrialists by providing fiscal in-
centives, and fostered some diversification of agricultural exports. 15
11. Latin Am. Regional Rep./Mexico & Cent. Am., Jan. 8, 1982, at 7. See also STATIS-
TICS Y.B., supra note 10.
12. For background on fiscal debt, see Latin Am. Regional Rep./Mexico & Cent. Am.,
Jan. 8, 1982, at 7. Historically, inflation was low in Central America, but over the last dec-
ade it has become a serious problem. In Costa Rica inflation in 1981 was running at about
60%, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1981, at A7, col. 1, and in Nicaragua at nearly 50%, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 31, 1981, at A7, col. 1.
13. Regional economic growth averaged 5% a year or more. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1982,
at Al, col. 3, A6, col. 4; Feinberg, supra note 9, at 1121.
14. See Lowenthal & Fishlow, Latin America's Emergence: Toward a U.S. Response,
243 HEADLINE SERIES 15 (1979). While Central America has increased its economic inter-
dependence, generally and vis-a-vis the United States, it should not of necessity follow that
the United States has a compelling economic stake in the region. On both points, see U.S.
National Interest in Latin America: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs
ofthe House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, 29-32 (1981) (statement of
Abraham F. Lowenthal, Brookings Institution). See also Feinberg, supra note 9, at 1145.
U.S. private investment in Central America has been small, particularly in El Salvador; in
Guatemala it totaled $260 million in 1980; in Honduras, $250 million; in Costa Rica, $210
million; in Nicaragua, $160 million; and in El Salvador, $145 million. N.Y. Times, July 9,
1980, at A10, col. 1.
15. Foreign trade accounts for over 60% of the gross domestic product of most Central
American countries. Economies so structured are especially vulnerable to fluctuations in
world commodity prices and interest rates. For an econometric model demonstrating this
vulnerability, see Sit, A Minimodel of External Dependence of the Central American Econo-
mies, in SHORT-TERM MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES 289 (J.
Behrman & J. Hanson eds. 1979). For a general discussion on the economic effects of the
instability of export earnings from primary products in underdeveloped countries, see C.
KINDLEBERGER & P. LINDERT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 206-07 (6th ed. 1978).
Coffee is by far the most important regional export; in 1979 it accounted for 41% of the
region's total export earnings. In 1981, however, coffee prices were at a five-year low. Latin
Am. Regional Rep./Mexico & Cent. Am., Jan. 8, 1982, at 7; Latin Am. Commodities Rep.,
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The emerging pattern of industrialization, however, brought only lim-
ited social prosperity.16 Duty-free entry of machinery drained foreign
exchange and facilitated the creation of capital intensive industries in a
region characterized by a labor surplus. These industries required con-
tinuous imports of capital goods that were not offset by industrial ex-
ports. In fact, the developing industries were incapable of successful
competition in world markets.
The strategies of economic growth in the region failed to redress the
highly unequal distributions of wealth and income.1 7 Mechanization of
agriculture reduced needs for manpower while the population contin-
ued to grow rapidly. Peasants flocked to the cities in search of jobs,
further depressing urban wages and increasing unemployment. 8
Access to governmental credit remained restricted to the landed and
capitalist elite, while the small farmer, who produced basic grains and
foodstuffs for the domestic market, was neglected. 19 Food became
more scarce and costly for a growing population that was already
poorly integrated into the productive economy.20 Though aware of
Feb. 20, 1981, at 3. See also STATISTICS Y.B.,supra note 10, at 153; 1981 COMMODITY Y.B.
92 (Commodity Research Bureau). Prices of other crops important in earning foreign ex-
change, such as cotton, sugar, and bananas, were also declining in the early 1980's. Int'l
Monetary Fund, 36 INT'L FIN. STATISTICS 57,59 (Feb. 1983). See also Latin Am. Commod-
ities Rep., Jan. 14, 1983, at 6-7. These circumstances have prompted calls for urgent and
massive international assistance. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1982, at Al, col. 3.
Though Central American countries are affected by external factors they cannot control,
the local elites also have been unable to generate through mutual agreement a stable re-
gional market. In fact, regional free trade agreements are often violated by governments
seeking to protect local industries. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1982, at Al, ol. 3, A6, col. 4. More-
over, the 1969 Honduran-Salvadoran conflict severely disrupted regional trade. See A.
BOLOGNA, CONFLICTO HONDURAs-EL SALVADOR (1977). See generally Baer & Coes,
Changes in the Inter-American Economic System, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM 35 (T. Farer ed. 1979); Lowenthal & Fishlow, supra note 14.
On import-substitution and protected industrialization generally, see B. SODERSTEN, IN-
TERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 216-18, 265 (2d ed. 1980).
16. See generally C. FURTADO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA 107-30
(2d ed. 1976); A. HIRSCMAN, A BIAS FOR HOPE 85-123 (1971); R. ARMSTRONG & J. SHENK,
EL SALVADOR: THE FACE OF REVOLUTION 44-45, 47 (1982). For other perspectives, see A.
GUNDER FRANK, LATIN AMERICA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT OR REVOLUTION (1969); F.
CARDOSO & E. FALETrO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1979).
17. See supra note 16; U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, Income Distribu-
tion in Latin America, U.N. Sales No. E.71.ll.G.2 (1971). See generally K. GRIFFIN, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE 247-55 (1974); G. FIELDS, POVERTY, INE-
QUALITY, AND DEVELOPMENT (1980).
18. R. PREBISCH, CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT: LATIN AMERICA'S GREATEST TASK 3-4
(197 1); R. ARMSTRONG & J. SHENK, supra note 16, at 47; K. GRIFFIN, supra note 17, at 69-
78. In 1980, 41% of El Salvador's population was classified as urban. INT'L BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT (WORLD BANK), WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1982
148.
19. K. GRIFFIN, supra note 17, at 26; K. GRIFFIN, LAND CONCENTRATION AND RURAL
POVERTY 119-24 (1976).
20. Food costs nearly quadrupled between 1960 and 1977; consumer prices doubled be-
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these social problems, the governing elites failed to expand the public
sector sufficiently,21 in part because of the private sector's resistance to
increased taxation. Nevertheless, the role played by the public sector in
human development and infrastructure projects served to fuel popular
expectations of improved and increased social services.
Integration into the world economy made Central America vulnera-
ble to international developments. Initially, the oil price increases of
1973-74 had a limited impact because of relatively high prices for cof-
fee, the region's main crop. By 1980, however, with coffee prices de-
clining,22 expensive oil had a clearly exacerbating effect on a worsening
imbalance of payments. In addition, high interest rates aggravated the
situation. And revenues have been affected by adverse terms of trade,
which also generate smaller tax bases and thus reduced income from
import taxes.
Economic modernization helped shape new social classes that began
to demand substantive changes in the region's political-economic sys-
tems. 23 Mechanization of agriculture required salaried rural workers,
who, with their urban counterparts, proved capable of organized polit-
ical activities, which were particularly effective if they received the sup-
port or tacit approval of the Catholic Church. Emerging industries and
services in the cities harbored increasing numbers of urban workers,
while a large portion of the potential labor force remained unemployed
or underemployed in marginal communities and shanty towns.24 Such
socioeconomic changes, coupled with improved transportation, trans-
formed isolated rural communities into constituent elements of inte-
grated national societies. Improved communications and increasing,
albeit limited, expansion of educational opportunities created a citi-
zenry politically more aware of its position, of the shortcomings of the
national social structure, and of potential alternatives that would en-
hance their interests. 25 From the growing universities and the urban
middle classes came a political leadership capable of articulating de-
mands of skilled and unskilled workers.26
Ruling elites in the region, however, have been unresponsive to polit-
tween 1975 and 1981. 1980 NATIONAL AccouNT STATISTICS 337; Int'l Monetary Fund, 36
INT'L FIN. STATISTICS 152 (Feb. 1983). For demographic data on El Salvador, see infra
notes 29-31.
21. See generally K. GRiFFiN, supra note 17.
22. See supra note 15; see also Int'l Monetary Fund, 36 INT'L FIN. STATISTICS 152 (Feb.
1983).
23. Feinberg, supra note 9, at 1122.
24. See supra note 18.
25. R. PREBISCH, supra note 18, at 4.
26. Feinberg, supra note 9, at 1122.
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ical demands for fundamental socioeconomic change, except, to some
degree, in Costa Rica. Faced with intransigent elites who denied actual
power-sharing through peaceful electoral processes, opposition forces
organized popular movements for eventual political-military confron-
tations with the established governments. In the ensuing turmoil, pri-
vate capital, both local and foreign, began to flee the region.27 Capital
flight aggravated the balance of payments situation, lessened the avail-
ability of credit, and reduced overall investment. Moreover, private
sector withdrawals caused tax bases to shrink, thus creating further
pressures on the public sector.
Economic reconstruction will demand renewed private sector confi-
dence in the political stability of the region. Without minimum domes-
tic order, investors will not be attracted. But a new political
equilibrium will not materialize without the participation of the organ-
ized groups that speak for the working class interests. The primary
challenge facing decision-makers is to find a solution that is based on
the incorporation of the new social classes and that is capable of en-
couraging economic development. In the absence of a realistic accom-
modation of these political forces, it is submitted that neither local
economic reforms nor foreign aid will achieve meaningful
development.
III. The Political-Military Arena in El Salvador: The
Government's Approach
Regional economic stagnation and even decline provide the critical
background against which the current political-military crisis in El Sal-
vador must be assessed. The roots of the Salvadoran civil war lie in the
historical unwillingness or inability of the ruling elite28 to redress une-
qual distribution of land29 and income,30 to create a dynamic and self-
27. See supra note 10; Feinberg, supra note 9, at 1135.
28. H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 201-04 (elites and the ruling class). For
background on the Salvadoran ruling elite, see T. ANDERSON, MATANZA (1971) (on 1932
peasant uprising and massacre); McDonald, El Salvador: The High Cost of Growth, in
LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT (H. Wiarda & H. Kline eds. 1979); S.
WEBRE, JosE NAPOLEON DuARTE AND THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN SALVADO-
RAN POLITICS 1960-1972 (1979); Armstrong, El Salvador: Why .Revolution?, NACLA RE-
PORT ON THE AMERICAS, Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 3; LeoGrande & Robbins, Oligarchs and
Officers, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 1084 (1980); S. VOGELGESANG, AMERICAN DREAM, GLOBAL
NIGHTMARE: THE DILEMMA OF U.S. HUMAN RIcusrrs POLICY 163-79 (1980); Pinel, Elgope
de estado an El Salvador: I Un camino hacia la democratizacion?, 42 REVISTA MEXICANA DE
SOCIOLOGIA 669 (1980); Zaid, Colegas Enemigos: Una lectura de la tragedia salvadorena, 5
VUELTA, July 1982, at 9.
29. El Salvador, a densely populated nation the size of Massachusetts, remains primarily
an agricultural country: 50% of the economically active population works in agriculture, a
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sustaining economy and integrate a rapidly growing population 3 into
that economy, and to create and maintain mechanisms for sharing
power with newly organized political groups.32
A. Recent History
This analysis of the current political-military crisis takes as its point
of departure the coup d'etat of October 15, 1979, which resulted in the
first organized junta in El Salvador's history. The junta demonstrated
an initial commitment to democratic institutions and popular accounta-
bility.33 It incorporated civilian politicians from across the political
spectrum, technocrats, and members of the progressive wing of the
armed forces, "the military youth." But on January 3, 1980, the moder-
ate civilian politicians in the junta and every civilian in the cabinet
resigned, citing both the junta's failure to implement promised reforms,
and increased governmental repression of popular political organiza-
tions.34 These resignations marked the end of a broad-based approach
sector of the economy accounting for over 25% of the gross national product. Yet about one-
fourth of the country's land is not in production, and much of the rest is either unsuitable for
intensive agriculture or used as pasture. Less than one-fifth of the land is suited for intensive
crops, mechanization, and irrigation. L. SIMON & J. STEPHENS, JR., EL SALVADOR LAND
REFORM 1980-1981: IMPACT AUDIT 2-3 (1981).
Over the last 20 years, three important developments took place with regard to land ten-
ure arrangements. Id at 5. First, the number of landless rural workers (people without
access to land by either renting, sharecropping, or owning) rapidly expanded. By 1981,
nearly 60% of the peasant population was landless. Second, the number of rental arrange-
ments rapidly increased, by over 100% between 1950 and 1971; at least 28% of all agricul-
tural units are rented. Moreover, 98% of such renting occurs on parcels smaller than five
hectares, which is below the minimum size required for subsistence farming. Finally, as a
result of the mechanization of agriculture and increased reliance on temporary rural work-
ers, the number of permanent resident laborers decreased from a high of 55,000 in 1961 to
17,000 by 1971. Id at 5-7.
At the top of the Salvadoran social structure is the landed elite, la oligarquia, traditionally
known as "the fourteen families" (their actual number is much higher; nowadays they may
number a few thousand people). Despite their small number, they have effectively con-
trolled the economy through their ownership of nearly 60% of the farmland, most industries,
and the financial system. Until the October 15, 1979 coup, the oligarchs ruled the country in
alliance with Salvadoran military officers. See LeoGrande & Robbins, supra note 28, at
1084-89.
30. More than two-thirds of the Salvadoran people possess less than one-third of dispos-
able national income. In contrast, less than two percent of the population receives one-third
of the disposable income. L. SIMON & J. STEPHENS, JR. supra note 29, at 7. See also Millett,
The Politics of Violence: Gruatemala and El Salvador, 80 CuRRENT HISTORY 70, 71 (1981).
31. In 1960, the Salvadoran population totaled approximately 2.574 million; in 1980,
4.797 million. Population projections for the year 2000 estimate 8.708 million inhabitants.
20 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF LATIN AMERICA 66 (Table 623) (J. Wilkie ed. 1980).
32. See Gordon, Crisispoliticay organizacionpopular en El Salvador, 42 REvISTA MEXi-
CANA DE SOCIOLOcIA 695 (1980); LeoGrande & Robbins, supra note 28, at 1086-89.
33. LeoGrande & Robbins, supra note 28, at 1093-97.
34. The letters of resignation of the civilian members of the Salvadoran junta, and those
of ministers, undersecretaries, and other government employees, are reprinted in U.S. Policy
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to political problems.
Each subsequent junta has excluded an additional part of the polit-
ical spectrum. The second junta, formed in January, 1980, after the
resignation of the moderates, included Christian Democratic Party
(C.D.P.) members but no left-of-center politicians. Within two months,
however, the more liberal C.D.P. representative in the junta and two
other high-level civilian officials resigned, arguing that the junta was
incapable of carrying out the promised reforms, of stopping violence
against the popular-base organizations, or of opening a constructive
political dialogue in the country.35 On the invitation of the military
officers, a conservative C.D.P. leader-Jose Napoleon Duarte-joined
the third junta,36 but more moderate factions of the C.D.P. were not
included, as a split between the old guard of the C.D.P. and its younger
activists grew more pronounced.
The process of gradual exclusions culminated in December, 1980,
when Colonel Adolfo Majano, a member of a faction of younger and
more moderate military officers, was ousted from the governing junta.37
In this fourth junta, which emerged in the wake of Majano's ouster,
Duarte was named President of the junta, a position that did not in-
clude control over the armed forces and security forces. Hierarchical
command and financial control over both the army and the security
forces was held by Colonel Jose Guillermo Garcia, the Minister of De-
fense and Public Security, which made him the most powerful member
of the governing junta.38
B. Political Oppression
Despite its initial inclusion of moderate political elements, the Salva-
doran junta demonstrated no sustained commitment to democracy. In
fact, from the beginning the junta moved on a variety of fronts to sup-
Toward El Salvador: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 68-69 (1981) [hereinafter Hearings].
35. Hearings, supra note 34, at 69 (letter of resignation of H. Dada Hirezi, C.D.P. mem-
ber of junta).
36. See generally Lernoux, El Salvador's Christian Democrat Junta, 231 NATION 632
(1980).
37. Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Dec. 12,1980, at 1. See generally id, July 31, 1981, at 2; id,
Dec. 19, 1980, at 1; Majano, El Salvador: 4 Better Plan, Boston Globe, Feb. 4, 1982, at 13,
col. 5; P. WHEATON, AGRARIAN REFoRM IN EL SALVADOR 6-8 (1980).
38. Since the early days of the civilian-military junta, effective power lay with the mili-
tary group, and in particular with the Minister of Defense and Public Security. See Hear-
ings, supra note 34, at 70 (letter of resignation by Salvador Samayoa and Enrique Alvarez
Cordova); Wash. Post, Mar. 9, 1981, at A19, col. 2; Giap's Pupils, EcONOMIST, Jan. 3, 1981,
at 29. As this issue went to press, then Gen. Garcia capitulated to Salvadoran military de-
mands and announced his resignation in April, 1983.
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press political opposition. Assuming both legislative and executive
powers, the junta began to rule by decree on October 15, 1979. 39 On
the day before the junta decreed agrarian reform, the government im-
posed a state of siege, which has been extended every thirty days from
March 5, 1980.40 The junta also retained prior legislation denying the
right to organize labor unions in rural areas and prohibiting the forma-
tion of "fronts" or "blocs" or other popular organizations.41 Conse-
quently, the most dynamic organized political movements in the
country remained illegal and subject to official suppression.
The junta also decreed legislation aimed at preventing strikes and
labor union activities in support of opposition political-military organi-
zations. Decree 544 of December, 1979, prohibited union activity for
wage increases. 42 Following an opposition-organized work stoppage in
June, 1980, the junta outlawed work stoppages and strikes by public
employees.4 3 In the same month, the junta restricted other peaceful
forms of organized dissent.44
The most repressive decree came into force on the day of mourning
for six murdered opposition leaders45 and the unearthing of the bodies
39. See Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Informe 1979-1980, reprinted
in 36 EsTuDIos CENTROAMERiCANOS 214, 215 (1981) [hereinafter Comision Interamericana
de Derechos Humanos].
40. Id
41. The only peasant organization with some degree of government protection is the
Union Comunal Salvadorena (U.C.S.). It probably owes its position to its association with
the American Institute for Free Labor Development (A.I.F.L.D.), an agency of the A.F.L.-
C.I.O. created to train campesino leaders as part of the Alliance for Progress. Except for the
U.C.S. and the paramilitary organization ORDEN, Salvadoran authorities regard peasant
organizations as subversive and treat them as guerrilla groups. See Hearings, Supra note 34,
at 105, 107 (Submission by Amnesty International to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights of the Organization of American States).
42. See Martin-Baro, La guerra civil en El Salvador, 36 ESTUDIOS CENTROAMERICANOS
17, 18 (1981).
43. Decree 296 denies, in practice, the right of association for public employees. Id;
AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE & AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR 253-54 (1982) [hereinafter REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS].
44. Decrees 264 and 265 altered the concept of "terrorism" in the Penal Code and the
Code of Penal Procedure. The new concept is broader and encompasses such peaceful acts
as the occupation of churches and other buildings. Martin-Baro, supra note 42, at 18. In
response to a public servant strike in August, 1980, the junta decreed a "state of emergency."
See id, and Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, supra note 39, at 215. The
text of this decree is reprinted in 35 ESTUDIOS CENTROAMERICANOS at 787 (1980). Decree
366 ordered the dissolution of professional and employee associations. See 35 ESTUDIOS
CENTROAMERICANOS 883 (1980).
45. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1980, at Al, col 4, A20, col. 1. A right-wing paramilitary
group, the Maximiliano Hernandez Brigade, claimed responsibility for the murders. Evi-
dence gathered by the San Salvador Archdiocese Legal Aid Office arguably shows complic-
ity on the part of the Salvadoran security forces. Statement by the San Salvador
Archdiocese Legal Aid Office (Socorro Juridico) on the Incidents at the San Jose High
Vol. 8:325, 1982
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of four murdered American churchwomen.46 On December 3, 1980,
the junta signed Decree 507,47 regulating the treatment of persons ac-
cused of treason, espionage, rebellion, sedition, and other crimes
against the independence of the state. This decree effectively milita-
rizes the administration of justice in El Salvador. It denies habeas
corpus and authorizes the military to detain suspects incommunicado
for up to fifteen days following arrest;48 then, even in the absence of
evidence, a military judge may at his discretion sentence the accused to
four months in corrective detention,49 while an investigation is to pro-
ceed. Such a provision, it has been noted, presents the opportunity for
arbitrary detention, intimidation, torture, and the extraction of extraju-
dicial confessions from critics and opponents.50 In all, the decree al-
lows the military to hold a suspect incommunicado for up to 195 days,
and arguably even longer, since the decision to set a case for trial is not
subject to a time requirement.5 1 The initial judicial investigation is
secret, and the accused has no right to counsel during that time.5 2 A
person might become a suspect through denunciation, accusation, or
official order; denunciation and informing had already been en-
couraged by the armed forces in published advertisements. 53
Decree 507 sets forth an expansive scope of admissible evidence, in-
cluding many extrajudicial confessions, anything on the person of the
suspect or in the place he was found, ranging from arms to subversive
literature, and private documents.5 4 Proof of membership in an illicit
association can be established by showing that the suspect's name has
been mentioned in any media in El Salvador or abroad in connection
with a subversive union, association, organization, or party.5 5 The de-
cree legalizes any detention of Salvadoran citizens based on suspicion
of culpability as determined by the military authorities.
Killings of unarmed civilians by the armed forces and security forces
School (Externado San Jose) on November 27, 1980 (Nov. 28, 1980 translated version on file
with The Yale Journal of World Public Order).
46. See Allman, The Haig Doctrine, HARPER'S, June 1981, at 26; N.Y. Times, Feb. 11,
1982, at Al, col. 2.
47. Decree 507 is reprinted in 36 EsrUDIos CENTROAMERICANOS 97-99 (1981), and in
translation in REPORT ON HumA RIGHTs, supra note 43, at 264-70. For a general discus-
sion of its provisions, see id at 91-105.
48. Decree 507, supra note 47, art. 4.
49. Id art. 6.
50. REPORT ON HUMAN RiGrHTs, supra note 43, at 93.
51. Id at 94-95.
52. Decree 507, supra note 47, art. 7.
53. See White, EI Salvador Between Two Fires, AMERICA, Nov. 1, 1980, at 262 (including
quotation of advertisement).
54. Decree 507, supra note 47, art. 11.
55. Id
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continue uncurtailed.5 6 There is also evidence that these forces consti-
tute the principal source of political violence against the civilian popu-
lation,57 though such charges are concededly difficult to prove
conclusively. In addition, the armed forces and security forces are re-
ported to have engaged in killings at government farms established to
provide security for civilians.5 8
Observers from human rights organizations maintain that there has
been official cooperation in, or at least toleration of, right-wing terror-
ism.59 The government has not moved forcefully against paramilitary
groups and "death squads.' ' 60 Despite Decree 12 of November 6, 1979,
which formally dissolved ORDEN, the largest Salvadoran paramilitary
56. See Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, supra note 39, at 217;
Manchester Guardian Weekly, April 19, 1981, at 6, col. 2 (30 civilians killed); N.Y. Times,
July 13, 1981, at A3, col. 2 (27 civilians tortured and killed); Boston Globe, Aug. 18, 1981, at
I, col. 2, 9, col. 1 (23 civilians killed); Office Memorandum, Human Rights Office of the
National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Dec. 30, 1981; N.Y. Times, Jan. 27,
1982, at Al, col. 4 (700-900 civilians killed); N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1982, § 4, at 1, col. 3.
The Legal Aid Office of the Archdiocese of San Salvador (Socorro Juridico) reported the
killing of 12,501 noncombatants in 1981, and 8,062 in 1980. Of the 12,501 killings in 1981,
the governmental forces, in their various units, were claimed to be responsible for 7,396.
These figures are based only on cases for which there is documented personal testimony; the
actual number is likely to be higher. See Washington Office on Latin America, Statement
Accompanying Press Release (Feb. 1, 1982), at 1 (on file with The Yale Journal of World
Public Order) [hereinafter Washington Office on Latin America].
57. See Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1982: Hearings
Before the Subcoma onAppropriations of the House Comm on 4ppropriations, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1981).
The Salvadoran junta decreed martial law on January 12, 1981. Figures from the Archdi-
ocese Legal Aid Office indicate that some 2,127 noncombatant civilians were summarily
executed during curfew hours, when only governmental forces were allowed in the streets.
See Washington Office on Latin America, supra note 56, at 1.
Various human rights organizations have asserted that the Salvadoran government forces
are responsible for the vast majority of the killings in the country. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1981,
§ 4, at 2, col. 3. In a recent report on the human rights situation, the American Civil Liber-
ties Union and The Americas Watch Committee held the Salvadoran government responsi-
ble for the disappearance of more than 600 people, and accused the government of
repressing the Catholic Church, of allowing arbitrary arrests and widespread torture to oc-
cur, of permitting the government forces to engage in politically motivated murders, and of
suspending freedom of the press. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1982, at AI0, col. 1; REPORT ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43.
58. In 1980, the Institute for Agrarian Transformation (I.S.R.A.) investigated 210 kill-
ings. The official in charge of conducting the inquiry testified that "[o]f these 210 1 can say
that maybe 80 percent were committed by the armed forces." Hearings, supra note 34, at
190, 200 (statement of Leonel Gomez).
59. See Legal Aid Office Vows to Continue Struggle, REPORT ON EL SALVADOR/NEws-
LETTER OF THE RELIGIOUS TASK FORCE ON EL SALVADOR, Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 3 (interview
of Roberto Cuellar of the Legal Aid Office of San Salvador); Hearings, supra note 34, at 105,
109-11 (submission by Amnesty International); Comision Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos, supra note 39, at 217.
60. See 232 NATION 590 (1981) (reporting statements of R.A. Fiallos, former army cap-
tain and doctor who fled El Salvador, on relationship between government, paramilitary
forces, and death squads).
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organization,61 evidence suggests that ORDEN continues to operate
alongside the armed forces and security forces.62 Decree 12 ordered the
confiscation of arms from ORDEN members, but, according to Am-
nesty International, "no such confiscation has taken place. ' 63 Further-
more, since ORDEN was formally dissolved, there has not been a
single prosecution of ORDEN members for acts of violence. Nor has




Unable to defend the human rights record of the junta, supporters
have stressed instead the importance of the three-phase agrarian re-
form. Yet the agrarian reform project has failed to bring about signifi-
cant socioeconomic change. The junta promulgated the reforms
without either prior studies or a clear strategy of implementation.
65
For example, Phase III, the "land-to-the-tiller" program, would trans-
fer to all renters ownership of the land they work. 6 Yet, as the Oxfam-
America impact audit of the agrarian reform demonstrates, Phase III
"ignores the specific agricultural practices of El Salvador" and "locks
for 30 years over 100,000 peasant families onto poor plots of land that
do not provide subsistence and cannot sustain continuous food-crop
production. '67 While Phase III has yet to be substantially or compe-
tently implemented, its conceptual inadequacies are patent. The re-
form was not properly announced or made clear to the peasants in El
Salvador.6 8 A report by the A.I.F.L.D.-supported Union Comunal
Salvadorena asserted that the program was in a state of near-collapse
due to military terror, illegal evictions, and a hostile bureaucracy; in-
deed, only some 20,000 peasants have received provisional titles to land
61. ORDEN has between 80,000 and 100,000 members, although not all perform armed
security functions. See Hearings, supra note 34, at 105, 110 (submission by Amnesty
International).
62. Id. at 111. For documented cases of cooperation between ORDEN and government
forces, see id at 112-21.
63. Id at 110.
64. Id at 110. Decree 12 provides for such a prosecution.
65. A U.S. A.I.D. strategy paper, El Salvador: Agrarian Reform Organization Project
Paper, noted the absence of preparatory planning in regard to Phase III of the agrarian
reform project. Cited in L. SIMON & J. STEPHENS, JR., supra note 29, at 45. The planning of
Phase I suffered due to secrecy and minimal technical discussion in the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Livestock. Id at 24-26.
66. For the decree of the expropriation and transfer of agricultural lands to tillers, see
id, at 13-17 of app. (Decree 207).
67. Id at 71. For a discussion of the agricultural impact of the land-to-the-tiller pro-
gram, see id at 55-56; for a general analysis of the program, see id at 56-63.
68. See LeoGrande,4 Splendid Little War, 6 INT'L SECURITY 27, 34-35 (1981).
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under the program.69
The failure to implement any part of Phase II had an altogether dif-
ferent political significance. Phase II was designed to expropriate es-
tates in the range of 150 to 500 hectares and to establish cooperatives.
This reform potentially was the most likely to achieve socioeconomic
change, for it would have affected the lands producing most of the
country's agricultural export crops.70 Initially, the junta merely post-
poned the implementation of Phase II, but in early July, 1981, the gov-
emnment dropped plans to carry it out.71 Cancellation was a clear
victory for the landed oligarchy and indicated that the junta remained
responsive to the class that has traditionally controlled the economy.
Phase I was partly implemented, but the socioeconomic impact of
this reform has been limited and mostly negative. Phase I expropriated
large landed estates (those in excess of 500 hectares) and transferred
them to peasant-controlled cooperatives, a reform that potentially
could affect 14% of the coffee plantations and 31% of the cotton
farms. 72 By invoking the "right of reserve," 73 however, landowners
have the potential to retain one-third of the available land.74 More-
over, in July, 1981, the government decided to remove cotton planta-
tions from the land redistribution program.
75
Phase I did not benefit the landless peasants who comprise 60% of
the rural population.76 For the approximately 62,000 families of bene-
ficiaries under the plan, it has been a mixed blessing. Between the first
junta's proclamation of a future agrarian reform program in October,
1979, and the promulgation of the reform on March 6, 1980 (and even
afterwards), landowners removed machinery, cattle, and other movable
property and divided their estates among relatives to avoid the impact
of the reform.77 When an estate did become a cooperative, government
forces and technicians took charge. Violence against the cooperative
69. N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1982, at A10, col. 3.
70. L. SIMON & J. STEPHENS, JR., supra note 29, at 19. Phase II would have affected-
figures vary-lands that account for 70 to 85% of the coffee production in an economy in
which that commodity, a labor intensive crop, accounts for 60 to 70% of agricultural exports.
It also would have affected about 50% of the sugar plantations.
71. N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1982, at A10, col. 3; id, July 8, 1981, at A2, col. 3. Seegenerall,
L. SIMON & J. STEPHENS, JR., supra note 29, at 41.
72. L. SIMON & J. STEPHENS, JR., supra note 29, at 38.
73. Id at 23.
74. Only about 12% of El Salvador's coffee plantations have been affected by the agra-
rian reform. N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1982, at A10, col. 3.
75. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1981, at A2, col. 3.
76. L. SIMON & J. STEPHENS, JR., supra note 29, at 36-38, 70.
77. Id at 27-31; Buckley, Letterfrom El Salvador, NEw YORKER, June 22, 1981, at 41,
56.
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leaders and extortion against the cooperatives followed.78 Government
forces extracted "protection money" from the cooperatives, 79 which
themselves suffered from administrative deficiencies at the hands of in-
experienced government technicians. Frequently, the peasants were ef-
fectively prevented from participating in the decision-making process.8 0
The supposed beneficiaries' political loyalty to the junta has not signifi-
cantly increased.81 The murder of the President of the Institute for
Agrarian Transformation, Roberto Vieira, and the forced exile of his
assistant, Leonel Gomez, further undermined the legitimacy of the
agrarian reform.8 2
Other reformist measures designed to support the agrarian reform,
such as the nationalization of foreign trade and banking, resulted in
increased governmental control over the economy without any signifi-
cant improvement in economic efficiency or popular welfare. Private
sector investment came to an almost complete standstill, primarily in
response to the presence of members of the C.D.P. in the junta.8 3 For-
eign commercial banks have "virtually closed their doors" to El Salva-
dor, according to a Salvadoran business association."4 Capital flight
78. LeoGrande, supra note 68, at 33; Washington Office on Latin America, supra note
56, press release at 7; N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.
79. Buckley, supra note 77, at 55. According to a Salvadoran government official, "80
cooperatives were paying 'protection money' to local military commanders." N.Y. Times,
Feb. 22, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.
80. Buckley, supra note 77, at 54. Predictably, many peasants are themselves ill-pre-
pared to manage the cooperatives. Id; Boston Globe, Apr. 30, 1981, at 1, ol. 2.
81. A report prepared by the Union Comunal Salvadoran, a large democratic and anti-
communist peasant organization, found that the adverse political result of the agrarian re-
form was caused in part by "military-backed terror and murder." Report of Union
Comunal Salvadoran, quoted in White, There's a Better WayforlReagan to Help El Salvador,
Boston Globe, Feb. 11, 1982, at 21, col. 1. The agricultural workers' deteriorating economic
situation also undermines any attempt to enlist their support for the junta. Despite a pre-
dicted inflation rate for 1982 of almost 50%, sugar and cotton workers will receive the same
minimum wages they received in 1981 and coffee workers will continue to receive minimum
wages at the 1980 level. See Cent. Am. Rep., Dec. 5, 1981, at 382.
82. For background, see Hearings, supra note 34, at 190, 191 (statement of Leonel
Gomez); Latin Am. Regional Rep./Mexico & Cent. Am., Nov. 28, 1980, at 8.
83. Statements by Salvadoran businessmen in U.S. congressional hearings and their re-
marks printed in The Congressional Record illustrate the private sector's serious opposition
to the C.D.P. Much of the private sector regarded the Christian Democrats' doctrine of
comunitarismo as a type of socialism and accused President Duarte of rejecting their offers
to cooperate in the government's management of the economy. Duarte was often depicted
as an enemy of private enterprise economy. See Hearings, supra note 34, at 186-87 (state-
ment by Manuel Enrique Hinds, former Salvadoran Minister of the Economy and Executive
Director of the Productive Alliance of El Salvador); 126 CONG. REc. E3375-76 (daily ed.
July 2, 1980) (statement of Luis Arce Escalente); id, at E3461-62 (daily ed. July 21, 1980)
(same). See also Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Mar. 27, 1981, at 6; N.Y. Times, July 2, 1981, at
A8, col. 3; Wash. Post, June 27, 1981, at Al, col. 3.
84. Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Mar. 27, 1981, at 6, 7.
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rose to about $1.5 billion from December, 1978 to December, 1980,85
with most of the flight occurring in 1980. The economy remains in
serious trouble, and its future prospects are not bright.86 Moreover,
despite massive foreign economic assistance, mostly from the United
States, the junta has been incapable of bringing about economic
recovery.
87
IV. Opposition to the Junta
Political instability, governmental repression, failed reforms, and
continued economic decay and social inequality provided fertile
ground for the development of opposition forces in El Salvador. The
major opposition groups are the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (F.M.L.N.) and the Democratic Revolutionary Front (F.D.R.).
The two have formed a working if not united alliance against the gov-
ernment. The F.M.L.N., an amalgam of various Marxist-Leninist and
Castroist guerrilla groups, provides the military component of the op-
85. Latin Am. Regional Rep./Mexico & Cent. Am., Feb. 13, 1981, at 7, 8.
86. A recent study by the Central America University of El Salvador forecasts negative
reserves of about $73.7 million. Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Sept. 25, 1981, at 7. Trade deficit
estimates for 1981 were approximately $170 million. Cent. Am. Rep., Oct. 3, 1981, at 306.
Reputedly because of continued political violence in the country, both the World Bank and
the Inter-American Development Bank have shown reluctance to provide further loans to El
Salvador. See Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Sept. 11, 1981, at 2, 4.
In 1978, the gross national product grew at a rate of 4%. In 1980, El Salvador was the only
country in the hemisphere to have negative growth; according to the United Nations Com-
mission for Latin America, production declined by nearly 9%. In 1981 production again
decreased by almost 9%. Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Jan. 8, 1982, at 9; Wash. Post, June 27,
1981, at Al, col. 3.
87. Public debt grew from $504 million at the end of 1980 to $1 billion six months later.
Cent. Am. Rep., July 18, 1981, at 219. In part because of mismanagement and governmental
corruption, as well as the war, public investment has failed to maintain employment. Un-
employment is officially at about 30%, though independent sources are reported to estimate
that it is actually closer to 60%. See Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Mar. 27, 1981, at 6, 7. By mid-
1981, overall agricultural production had fallen 7%, construction 17.5%, and trade 12.1%.
Wash. Post, June 27, 1981, at Al, col. 3. According to the association of small businessmen,
Feneps, 15% of its members have gone bankrupt since the junta took over on October 15,
1979, and another 60% are "facing serious difficulties." Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Mar. 27,
1981, at 6, 7.
Industry is functioning at "little more than 50%" of capacity, according to both govern-
ment and independent sources, and private sources estimate that at least 15,000 jobs were
lost in the 18 months following the coup. Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Mar. 27, 1981, at 6, 7. To
make matters worse, in 1981 coffee prices reached a four-year low, putting the market price
of El Salvador's main export crop on par with production costs. In addition, both frost and
spreading coffee rust have hampered the short-term prospects of economic recovery. Latin
Am. Commodities Rep., Feb. 20, 1981, at 3.
The tourism industry has suffered a sharp decline due to the civil war, as has cattle pro-
duction. Cent. Am. Rep., Dec. 12, 1981, at 387; id, Jan. 9, 1982, at 8. The only economic
activity that showed a positive performance in 1981 was the production of basic grains such
as corn and rice. Cent. Am. Rep., May 2, 1981, at 132.
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position. The F.D.R., more moderate, is a broad political coalition that
includes peasant, student, labor, and professional organizations, as well
as political parties such as the Social Democrats and the large dissident
faction of the C.D.P. (its so-called "popular tendency," composed of
young, local activists). Together, the opposition groups have the active
support of about 100,000 people; up to 500,000 people have occasion-
ally given active support.8 The military strength of the guerrillas is
perhaps 5,000.89 The Christian Ecclesiastic Communities, which have
some overlapping membership with the F.M.L.N.-F.D.R., claim one
million members.90 Close to one-third of the Salvadoran people have
reportedly supported the opposition.91
From their earlier disparate form, the Salvadoran insurgents
achieved political-military consolidation quickly. Barely a week after
the January 3, 1980 collapse of the centrist junta, four front organiza-
tions created a "Coordinating Council of the Masses. ' 92 Less than
three weeks later, these groups organized a large political demonstra-
tion, possibly the largest in the country's history, a unity march in
which reportedly 200,000 people participated. 93 On April 18, 1980, op-
88. Gomez & Cameron, El Salvador: American Myths, 43 FOREIGN POL'Y 71, 74 (1981).
For a "Political Map of El Salvador's Revolutionary Forces," identifying the many groups
making up the opposition, see Armstrong & Shenk, El Salvador: A Revolution Brews,
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, July-Aug. 1980, at 2, 34-35. See also LeoGrande,
supra note 68, at 37-39; LeoGrande & Robbins, supra note 28, at 1087-97; Buckley, supra
note 77.
89. A U.S. Defense Department assessment of the military strength of the insurgents,
released in February, 1981, estimated that there were "3,700 full-time guerrillas and 5,000
who take occasional part in actions." N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1981, at 1, col. 1, 6, col. 4.
According to Salvadoran military leaders, there are between 5,000 and 7,000 guerrillas, in-
cluding part-time fighters. Id, Feb. 25, 1981, at A4, col. 1. Military commanders of the
F.M.L.N. claim about 5,000 trained guerrillas and 30,000 reservists. N.Y. Times, Dec. 27,
1981, at A3, col. 6; id, Jan. 3, 1981, at 3, col. 4. President Duarte estimated a total of
between 3,000 and 4,000 guerrillas. Id, Nov. 10, 1981, at Al, col. 3, A7, col. 1.
90. Processo, Mar. 30, 1981, at 42, col 2. For background on the role of Catholics in
Salvadoran politics, see Riding, The Swordand Cross, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, May 28, 1981,
at 3; Hehir, El Salvador: A View from the Church, 43 FOREIGN PoL'Y 83 (1981). On the
"theology of liberation" as an influence on the F.M.L.N. guerrillas, see Wash. Post, Feb. 22,
1982, at Al, col. 2.
91. Prepared Statement of Robert S. Leiken Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American
Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Sept. 24, 1981, at 10. Leiken also estimates,
though the figures are difficult to verify, that the government at the time enjoyed at most the
support of one-fifth of the people. The author thanks U.S. Representative Samuel Gejden-
son of Connecticut for a copy of this unpublished manuscript. See generall Leiken, Eastern
Winds in Latin America, 42 FOREIGN POL'Y 94, 103 (1981).
92. The organizations were the People's Revolutionary Bloc (B.P.R.), United Popular
Action Front (F.A.P.U.), People's Leagues-28th of February (L.P.-28), and the Nationalist
Democratic Union (U.D.N.). Armstrong & Shenk, supra note 88, at 11.
93. Id at 12. The demonstrators were attacked by guards and sharpshooters placed on
the roofs of the National Palace. At least 20 demonstrators were killed. REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 43, at xxiv, xxxii.
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position groups formalized their alliance by creating the F.D.R.
94
Initially, the F.D.R. attempted to assert its political authority
through work stoppages, but despite initial successes, these actions be-
came ineffective due to the strong government response. That response
featured Decree 296, which threatened summary dismissal for those
public servants absent from work, the presence of military forces in the
streets, a campaign of intimidation against bus owners, and govern-
mental control of the mass media.95 The decrease in the effectiveness
of these labor actions, however, does not necessarily indicate a decline
in the unity or popularity of the F.D.R. More likely it illustrates the
effectiveness of government actions, particularly the continued "state of
siege,"'96 Decree 296, and the "state of emergency," 97 in making peace-
ful opposition impossible. Given that peaceful opposition is impossi-
ble, the primary measure of the strength of the insurgents has been
their ability to maintain political-military offensives.98 On the first an-
niversary of the coup of October 15, 1979, the junta launched a major
military offensive against the insurgents in the Morazan province. The
government used some 5,000 troops, backed by helicopter gunships and
94. Armstrong & Shenk, supra note 88, at 23-25; REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 43, at xxiv.
95. Armstrong & Shenk, supra note 88, at 25 (successful June, 1980 action); J.L.A., El
paro nacional de los dtas 13, 14y 15 de agosto, 35 ESTUDIOS CENTROAMERICANOS 717, 718
(1980) (failure of August, 1980 action). For background on Decree 296, see REPORT ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 253-54.
96. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Decree 155, of March 6, 1980, a second
state of siege decree, suspended several constitutional guarantees: freedom of movement
and residence, freedom of thought and expression, inviolability of correspondence, and the
right of assembly, except for meetings or assemblies for cultural or industrial purposes. See
REPORT ON HUMAN RIoHTS, supra note 43, at xxxi; Comision Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos, supra note 39, at 215 (re Decree 2, establishing the first state of siege); Le Monde,
Jan. 8, 1981, at 3, col. 1. On October 30, 1981, the junta once again extended the "state of
siege" for 30 days, but declared that conservative political parties were exempt from restric-
tions on freedom of press and expression. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1981, § 1, at 7, col. 2.
97. The junta decreed a "state of emergency" on August 21, 1980 (Decree 43). This
executive decree placed the Ministry of Defense and Public Security in control of some of
the country's most important public service institutions and autonomous government agen-
cies, including water, electric, telephone, and port authorities. Employees of these institu-
tions were viewed as having enlisted in the armed forces. See REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 43, at 254; Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, supra note 39, at
215.
98. This has been particularly so since the August, 1980 work stoppage. During those
three days, there were approximately 350 insurrectionary actions, and as many as 200
deaths; the junta claimed military losses of only 12 men, but unofficial sources put the total
at 50. J.L.A., supra note 95, at 718; Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Aug. 22, 1980, at I. Earlier, the
insurgents had begun to establish their presence and political influence in the rural areas of
Chalatenango, Metapan, San Vicente, and a large area in the Morazan province around San
Francisco Gotera, and they had fought in other areas, including San Salvador province,
Usalatan, and La Union. Latin Am. Regional Rep./Mexico & Cent. Am., July 11, 1980, at
5. See also id, Nov. 28, 1980, at 7, 8; Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Aug. 22, 1980, at 1.
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light artillery.99 The offensive failed to dislodge the insurgents perma-
nently; it did, however, result in the deaths of approximately 200 peas-
ants and possibly many more, and created as many as another 5,000
refugees.oo
Since the "formal outbreak' 0' of the civil war on January 10, 1981,
the insurgents have proved capable of conducting military operations
on a large scale throughout the country,'0 2 though the military situation
appeared stalemated in 1982. While the insurgents do not have "liber-
ated zones," 3 they have established areas of political-military domi-
nance in which they run small weapons factories, hospitals, military
training camps, schools for peasants and their children, and basic agri-
cultural operations. In these areas the insurgents control roads and
have built the framework for a politically organized community.
The fighting has taken a significant toll on government forces.
Though the Salvadoran military has hesitated to release casualty esti-
mates, mid-1981 statistics released by U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton
showed "1,300 government casualties since January, including more
than 350 killed," 104 a significant number for a government whose army
then totaled 17,000.105 The ability of the junta to respond to the insur-
99. Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Oct. 24, 1980, at 1.
100. Id, Oct. 31, 1980, at I.
101. Martin-Baro, supra note 42, at 21-25.
102. In 1981 the F.M.L.N. claimed to be active in "13 of the country's 14 departments";
Pentagon estimates largely corroborate these claims. Cent. Am. Rep., June 11, 1981, at 209-
10 (including Pentagon map of F.M.L.N.-controlled areas). See also sources at supra note
98; N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1982, at Al, col 3; Shenk, El Salvador, NACLA REP. ON THE
AMERICAS, May-June, 1981, at 2, 11-14; Brown, Ballots Won't Stop the Bullets, 234 NATION
238 (1982).
In April, 1981 the F.M.L.N. claimed to control 10 to 15% of the country, and by July 30%.
Latin Am. Regional Rep./Mexico & Cent. Am., July 10, 1981, at 1. Some observers have
suggested that approximately one-third of El Salvador is controlled by the insurgents. See
Le Monde, Feb. 5, 1982, at 4, col. 5. Many do maintain that, in fact, the government has lost
control of about one-quarter of the national territory. See Manchester Guardian Weekly,
Jan. 24, 1982, at 11, col. 4. Whether the insurgents have the resources and support to extend
their gains and seriously threaten the government's remaining authority remains
problematic.
103. Le Monde, Jan. 9, 1981, at 7, col. 1. In fact it would be difficult to establish "liber-
ated zones" in El Salvador. The country is approximately the size of Massachusetts and is
criss-crossed with roads. There are many airstrips facilitating transportation of government
troops, but there are no major tropical forests in which the guerrillas can shelter themselves.
Under such conditions, it seems an impressive accomplishment that the insurgents have es-
tablished political-military dominance in one-fourth to one-third of the territory.
104. Wash. Post, Aug. 30, 1981, at A19, col. 1.
105. In March, 1981, John D. Bushnell, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, testified that there were about 17,000 government troops in El Salvador.
Hearings, supra note 34, at 18, 29. However, Salvadoran troop levels have expanded, doubt-
less due in large part to U.S. military assistance. Recent information puts the total figure at
25,000 in January, 1982; it may increase to 30,000 toward late 1982. Manchester Guardian
Weekly, Jan. 24, 1982, at 11, coL 4. According to then President Duarte, the armed forces
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gents' attacks has been hampered further by doubts about troop loy-
alty. The defection of two army captains and their companies to the
F.M.L.N. at Santa Ana during the January, 1981 offensive confirmed
these doubts.106
In addition to combat capability, the F.M.L.N. has shown a capacity
to cause serious economic disruption.10 7 The exact extent of such eco-
nomic damage is as yet unknown, but reports suggest that it is substan-
tial.10 8 Under such circumstances, no local program of economic
recovery or project to attract foreign investment is likely to succeed.
It does not follow, however, that the F.M.L.N. can achieve a military
victory, at least in the short run. The response to the guerrillas' general
offensive in January, 1981, demonstrated that the army and security
forces control the capital city and can prevent general strikes.10 9 Since
that fighting, itself preceded by the junta's unsuccessful October, 1980
attack on the guerrillas in Morazan province,1 0 the military situation
has remained stalemated. It is unlikely that the government will gain a
decisive advantage." 1
Moreover, among those who support neither the F.M.L.N.-F.D.R.
nor the junta, there is "an overriding hatred of the military" and a no-
tion that any alternative to the present situation would be preferable. "12
In sum, the insurgents are now, and, for the foreseeable future will be
able to impose high costs on the government, but may be unable to
would need 40,000 to 50,000 troops to defeat and control the insurgents. N.Y. Times, Nov.
10, 1981, at Al, col. 3.
106. Martin-Baro, supra note 42, at 21. For background, see El Salvador Testimonlo de
un militar quepasa a las guerrillas, Ahora!, Mar. 2, 1981, at 14 (interview with army captain
and text of pact he signed in name of "military youth").
107. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Aug. 30, 1981, at A19, col. I (F.M.L.N. sabotage against pub-
lic utilities); N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1981, at A9, col. 5 (blackout of San Miguel); Id, Dec. 5,
1982, § 1, at 19, col. 1 (report of summary study).
108. A recent unreleased Salvadoran government study, apparently the first effort to as-
sess the economic impact of the war, was reported in news media in late 1982. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 5, 1982, § 1, at 19, col. 1. Though a total figure could not be generated, damages were
placed in the tens of millions of dollars, a sizeable figure for a country with the resources of
El Salvador. Included were $41.5 million in damages over 20 months to bridges, roads,
railways, public buildings, and other government property. The destruction of 34 bridges
and 145 electrical transmission towers was noted, as were damages to the telephone and bus
systems, the removal of large areas of farmland from production (due to attacks from both
the right and the left), the loss of more than 18,000 jobs, and the closing of many businesses.
109. See Martin-Baro, supra note 42, at 21.
110. See Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Oct. 31, 1980, at 1; Id, Oct. 24, 1980, at 1; N.Y. Times,
Dec. 11, 1981, at A6, col. 4.
111. In fact, U.S. Representative Michael Barnes, Chairman of the House Subcommittee
on Inter-American Affairs, has revealed that "classified military analysis" puts the likeli-
hood of a military victory for the F.M.L.N. at better than 50%. Latin Am. Weekly Rep.,
Oct. 2, 1981, at 2, 4.
112. Wash. Post, June 7, 1981, at A21, col. 1. See also Statement by R.S. Leiken, supra
note 91, at 10.
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prevail. Undoubtedly, the government's earlier expectation of a quick
military victory at low economic and military cost will not materialize.
By late 1982, the insurgency had rooted itself deeply in Salvadoran so-
ciety and was likely to remain significant.
The preceding examination suggests certain characteristics of the
Salvadoran situation. The insurgency is aimed at altering governmen-
tal structures. The F.M.L.N.-F.D.R. has significant popular support.
The Salvadoran conflict can be characterized as class warfare in which
the insurgent coalition identifies with the economic and political de-
mands of the unskilled and skilled workers of the rural and urban ar-
eas. The Salvadoran opposition has woven progressive Catholic
thought (the "theology of liberation"), Marxism-Leninism, and notions
of equity into an indigenous justification for a socialist program similar
to the Sandinista program in Nicaragua. The basic elements of the
F.D.R. program are non-alignment, a mixed economy, the nationaliza-
tion of export industries and certain public utilities, agrarian reform
designed to remove economic and political power from the coffee oli-
garchy, direct participation in government by the organizations com-
prising the F.D.R., support for small and medium-sized enterprises,
respect for basic human rights, and the honoring of previous foreign
debts, except those that arose from prior contracts for arms
purchases. 113
V. U.S. Reactions to the Crisis
Recent U.S. involvement in El Salvador must be assessed from two
perspectives: (1) its general propriety, given this Comment's treatment
of the intervention issue; and (2) its particular prospects for the
achievement of a peaceful solution, given the current political-military
situation. Analysis also must be undertaken of the fundamental as-
sumptions about the nature of the crisis that hitherto have shaped the
U.S. response.
A. Military and Economic Assistance
U.S. aid in recent years has been substantial and growing. This
trend represents a departure from the 1960's and early 1970's, when aid
was minimal, and El Salvador was perceived as having limited impor-
tance to U.S. strategic and economic interests.114 As concern for
113. See Update/Latin America, July-Aug. 1980, at 6. For a statement of the F.D.R.
platform, see Armstrong & Shenk, supra note 88, at 31-34.
114. LeoGrande & Robbins, supra note 28, at 1089.
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human rights became a focus of the Carter administration's foreign
policy, the U.S. government criticized El Salvador for the activities of
the right-wing death squads and their suspected links to the
government.
In 1977, the Salvadoran government (along with three other Latin
American countries) rejected U.S. military assistance to protest criti-
cism of its human rights record. After the junta came to power on Oc-
tober 15, 1979, Congress approved $5.7 million in military aid to El
Salvador for fiscal year 1981. During the insurgents' general offensive
of January, 1981, the Carter administration in its final days sent $5
million in emergency aid to the Salvadoran government based on the
alleged urgent need to offset impermissible military assistance by com-
munist governments to the insurgents.
The Reagan administration has increased sharply the U.S. commit-
ment to El Salvador. Secretary of State Haig pledged that the United
States would do "whatever is necessary" to prevent the overthrow of
the Salvadoran junta by the insurgents; he did not rule out the use of
U.S. troops.1 5 U.S. military assistance has increased in 1981-82 by
400% over the total aid sent between 1950 and 1979. In March, 1981,
the Reagan administration accelerated $25 million in additional aid to
permit the Salvadoran government to acquire helicopters, military ve-
hicles, surveillance equipment including radar, and small arms. By
that time, fifty-six U.S. military advisers were assigned to El Salvador.
Total U.S. military assistance to El Salvador in 1981 amounted to $35.5
million. 16 The Reagan administration planned further increases in
military aid to El Salvador for 1982. U.S. military training for Salva-
doran officer candidates was stepped up. Congress initially appropri-
ated $26 million for military aid to El Salvador for fiscal year 1982.117
Moreover, the Reagan administration promised from discretionary
Pentagon funds an additional $55 million in emergency military aid
both to replace the loss of helicopters and to improve the Salvadoran
military." 8 U.S. economic assistance to El Salvador in 1982 totaled
$192 million; for 1983 the administration proposed a figure of $205 mil-
lion." 9 The administration's request for military aid, it was reported,
would be for $110 million, nearly double the figure originally an-
nounced.'20 Despite substantial domestic criticism of such assistance,
115. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1982, § 4, at 1, col. 4.
116. Boston Globe, Feb. 3, 1982, at 9, col. 1.
117. Id
118. Id; N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1982, §4, at 1, col. 4.
119. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1983, at Al, col 2.
120. Id
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including a congressional requirement that the executive branch certify
semi-annually that progress is being made in the human rights area as
a condition to continued military assistance121-the administration ap-
pears determined to press its requests for increases in military and eco-
nomic assistance.1 22
B. The U.S. Perception of the Crisis
The Reagan administration's decision massively to increase U.S.
assistance to El Salvador is the product of its perception of the crisis.
That perception is embodied in a document issued by the State Depart-
ment in early 1981 entitled Communist Interference in El Salvador and
known popularly as the White Paper.1 23 Designed to outline official
thinking about the crisis, and to generate support for the U.S. position
in Europe and Latin America, the White Paper depicts the crisis as "a
textbook case of indirect armed aggression by Communist powers
through Cuba."'1 4 The implication, therefore, is that it is incumbent
on the United States to support the junta in order to deny further ex-
pansion of communism through illicit means. While a detailed review
of the White Paper is beyond the scope of this Comment, some obser-
121. Amidst criticism, the Reagan administration certified such progress in January,
1983.
122. On recent aid disputes in Congress, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1983, § 1, at 10, col. 1.
Because aid can come from a number of sources within the U.S. Government, it is difficult
to specify an exact total; in early 1983, Senator Christopher Dodd stated that the U.S. had
spent $748 million in El Salvador over the preceding three years. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1983,
at Al, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1983, § 4, at 5, col. 1. See also Boston Globe, Feb. 3, 1982,
at 9, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1982, § 1, at 1, col. 6. For reports on earlier years, see C.
ARNSON, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON EL SALVADOR AND U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO CENTRAL AMERICA, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES UPDATE No. 2 (Nov., 1980); C.
ARNSON, BACKGROUND ON U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR, INSTITUTE FOR
POLICY STUDIES UPDATE No. 3 (Jan., 1981); C. ARNSON, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON
EL SALVADOR AND U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL AMERICA, INSTITUTE FOR
POLICY STUDIES UPDATE No. 4 (Apr., 1981); BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
EL SALVADOR: THE SEARCH FOR PEACE 10 (1981); BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., U.S. DEP9T OF
STATE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 80, COMMUNIST INTERFERENCE IN EL SALVADOR (1981); U.S.
Policy Toward El Salvador: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, 24 (1981) (statement of Acting
Asst. Sec. of State John A. Bushnell).
123. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COMMUNIST INTERFERENCE IN EL SALVADOR: DOCUMENTS
DEMONSTRATING COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF THE SALVADORAN INSURGENCY (Feb. 23, 1981).
The White Paper consists of an analytical report and a set of 19 documents. The so-called
"Long Analysis," another analytical report but unaccompanied by documents, was pub-
lished as BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 80, COMMU-
NIST INTERFERENCE IN EL SALVADOR (Feb. 23, 1981). The New York Times published the
reports on Feb. 20, 1981, at A4, col. 1, and Feb. 24, 1981, at A8, col. 1. The reports and
documents are also reprinted in P. AGEE & W. POELCHAU, WHITE PAPER WHITEWASH
(1981).
124. SPECIAL REPORT No. 80, supra note 123, at 8.
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vations are appropriate, inasmuch as it is submitted that a legitimate
decision to assist an incumbent government by invoking the need to
offset prior illegitimate aid to insurgents requires presentation of firm
evidence of such aid. As it can be shown that the administration's view
of the crisis is profoundly misguided, it follows that the administra-
tion's reaction is misguided as well, in ways that portend increased re-
gional conflict and serious damage to U.S. foreign policy.
The principal evidence supporting the conclusions of the White Pa-
per consists of nineteen captured documents which are purported to
show assistance furnished to the insurgents by communist governments
(they are reprinted in an appendix to the White Paper). While charges
that the documents are fabricated1 25 cannot be proven, the conclusions
drawn from them are vulnerable to a number of attacks, even assuming
their authenticity. First, they simply do not support State Department
allegations. For example, while the White Paper claims that the docu-
ments provide direct support for figures on the extent of the communist
commitment to the insurgents, and on the amount of arms received
during the 1981 guerrilla offensive, both figures are extrapolations not
based on direct evidence.' 26 A second failing is that figures conceded
arguendo to be accurate lack the "ontext necessary for proper interpre-
tation. For example, the White Paper alleges that Viet Nam sent two
million rifle and machine gun bullets to the Salvadoran guerrillas;
while the figure appears substantial, given the total number of insur-
gents, it represents ammunition for only two days of combat. 27 Like-
wise, the 200 tons of supplies alleged to have been given to the
guerrillas during the 1981 offensive are, according to a Pentagon
source, a "spit in the bucket that a company of soldiers-200 troops-
could go through in a week."'
128
125. See, e.g., P. AGEE & W. POELCHAU, supra note 123, at 101 (1981); J. Petras, White
Paper on the White Paper, 232 NATION 353 (1981); McGehee, Foreign Policy by Forgery, 232
NATION 423 (1981). But see Schulz, The Strategy of Conflict and the Politics of Counter-
productivity, 25 ORnis 679, 698 n.14.
126. Wall St. J., June 8, 1981, at 10, col. 1. For other analyses and critiques of the White
Paper, see supra note 140; Wash. Post, June 9, 1981, at A14, col. 1; U.S. Representative
Michael Barnes, Point-by-Point Comments on the Administration's Rebuttal (June 11, 1981)
(press release on fie with The Yale Journal of World Public Order); Allman, The Haig Doc-
trine, HARPER'S, June 1981, at 26, 30-31; Feinberg, supra note 9, at 1133; Maslow & Arana,
Operation El Salvador, COL. JOURNALISM Rv. May/June 1981, at 55; Caldeira, Illegiti-
macy of the White Paper (unpublished manuscript on file with The Yale Journal of World
Public Order).
127. Hearings, supra note 34, at 190, 205 (statement of Leonel Gomez, former Salvado-
ran land reform official).
128. Wash. Post, Mar. 9, 1981, at A18, col. 1. For other indications that the White Paper
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Omitted from the White Paper is any significant discussion of the
guerrillas' other sources of arms, a most important issue given the
White Paper's contentions and obvious foreign policy objectives. In
contradistinction to the White Paper's claims, several observers have
argued that the guerrillas' chief source of arms is the black market
trade, financed by kidnapping ransoms and fundraising in Western Eu-
rope.129 Other charges made in the White Paper-that military train-
ing has been given to thirty Salvadoran students in Moscow, that
meetings have been held between insurgent leaders and Fidel Castro to
resolve tactical differences, that advice has been received from Cuban
officials--do show some external communist assistance, but given the
scale and prolonged character of the conflict, such levels of participa-
tion, even if they have occurred, seem negligible. They hardly make a
convincing case for external communist "coordination" and "indirect
aggression." In any event, in evaluating these charges, the assistance
should be measured against years of U.S. support for traditional right-
ist regimes in Latin America.
It is also important to note what the State Department has not
claimed-i.e., that the Salvadoran conflict was itself fomented by exter-
nal communist forces. While it is not directly relevant to the norm of
non-intervention developed here, it should be borne in mind that the
roots of the conflict go back several decades, and are found in the coun-
try's economic and political inequalities, and not in outside agitation.
No one can contend that the conflict exists only because of external
communist support, or that it would disappear if such support were cut
off.
VI. The March, 1982 Elections
Elections took place in El Salvador in March, 1982 to choose mem-
bers of the Constituent Assembly, which was to name a provisional
president, write a constitution, and determine the future of the junta's
programs. As Minister of Defense General Guillermo Garcia prom-
ised, the elections were held "under flying bullets,"'130 with one candi-
date shot dead, and another wounded.131 Despite a campaign by the
F.M.L.N. to discourage potential voters from casting ballots, voter
129. Gomez & Cameron, supra note 88, at 74; Allman, supra note 126, at 31. See also
Feinberg, supra note 9, at 1134 (noting captures and purchases from Salvadoran military in
addition to black market purchases); NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 1982, at 16, 22.
130. Cent. Am. Rep., June 6, 1981, at 171.
131. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1982, at A2, col. 5;1d, Apr. 5,1982, at Al, col. 3;id, Mar.
13, 1982, at 1, col. 2; TIME, Mar. 29, 1982, at 32, 34.
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turnout was relatively high.1 32 This turnout indicated support within
the Salvadoran population for the democratic process and for non-vio-
lent options to the continuing civil strife.133 Thus, the elections con-
veyed an important signal, and it was clearly wrong for the F.M.L.N. to
use violent means to discourage citizens from taking part.
134
Despite the high turnout, some conclusions drawn may be unwar-
ranted. For example, before the elections were held, the State Depart-
ment and the junta predicted that the elections would establish the
legitimacy of the regime,1 35 and after they were held, Secretary of State
Haig asserted that the results constituted a "political repudiation" of
the guerrilla movement. 136 Neither of these statements seems justified,
however.
At least four factors explain why the electoral results cannot be said
to have clarified the attitudes of important segments of the population
toward the regime and the F.M.L.N.-F.D.R. First, the center-left polit-
ical forces did not field candidates for the elections. 137 Second, approxi-
mately forty percent of the estimated number of eligible voters did not
132. The National Electoral Council issued more than two million voting certificates
(cedulas). Not even members of the Council knew exactly how many certificates were in
circulation. The assertion that there was in fact a relatively high turnout takes into account
the widespread expectation that there would be a fairly low turnout-at best, 800,000 ballots
cast. Interview with Professor Thomas Anderson (independent observer of the election),
Apr. 15, 1982 (on file with The Yale Journal of World Public Order) [hereinafter Anderson
Interview].
133. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1982, at Al, col. 3.
134. The F.M.L.N. actions forced polls to close in a provincial capital and 27 other
towns. New Haven Journal-Courier, Mar. 29, 1982 at 1, col. 4. However, the guerrillas
reportedly did not harass voters directly. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1982, at A9, col. 1; Boston
Globe, Mar. 30, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
135. See generally BuREAu OF PuB. AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, EL SALVADOR: THE
SEARCH FOR PEACE (1981). This should be weighed against the context of recent history in
El Salvador, where military governments have never lost an election. Fraud and intimida-
tion have assured victory for the government party, regardless of the popular will. It is
generally conceded that military fraud cost Duarte the 1972 presidential election. See gener-
ally S. WEBRE, supra note 28; Buckley, supra note 77, at 41; LeoGrande & Robbins, supra
note 28, at 1087. Likely the elections were a ploy to assuage international public opinion; if
that is the case, however, the junta was unsuccessful, for most western nations rejected any
role in supervising the elections. N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1982, § 4, at 1, col. 4; Id, Mar. 11,
1982, at A19, col. 1; id, Feb. 23, 1982, at All, col. 2.
In fact, there was a substantial body of opinion holding that conditions in El Salvador
were not conducive to free, fair, and representative elections. See, e.g., Cent. Am. Rep.,
Sept. 26, 1981, at 298, 299 (U.N. Human Rights Commission); Latin Am. Regional Rep./
Mexico & Cent. Am., Oct. 23, 1981, at l,'2 (Archbishop Rivera y Damas); N.Y. Times, Oct.
13, 1981, at 3, col. 4 (Col. Majano); Cent. Am. Rep., July 18, 1981, at 219 (Salvadoran
Federation of Lawyers).
136. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1982, at A10, col. 1.
137. In fact, the Minister of Defense had confirmed that the armed forces would veto the
participation of the F.D.R. Cent. Am. Rep., June 6, 1981, at 171. These intentions were
clarified in the army's release of a list of 137 "terrorists" that included the entire political
leadership of the F.D.R. Wash. Post, June 4, 1981, at A27, col. 2.
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cast ballots;1 38 low voter turnout occurred mainly in the provinces con-
trolled by the F.M.L.N. 139 Third, spoiled, blank, and "null" ballots
amounted to nearly twelve percent of the vote,14° possibly reflecting a
protest.1 41 Finally, voting is mandatory in El Salvador; 142 voters had
their identification cards stamped as evidence of participation in the
election.143 In a country where military authorities regularly check citi-
zens' documents in search of dissidents, a concern for personal safety
will promote voting. Nonetheless, despite a few irregularities 44 and
difficulties in controlling multiple voting, 45 observers agreed that, by
Salvadoran standards, the March 28 elections were conducted with a
high degree of procedural regularity.
Nevertheless, the elections are unlikely to contribute to, and in fact
might damage, the prospects for peace in El Salvador. The election
results' 46 weakened the center-right Christian Democratic Party,147 in-
138. See Anderson interview, supra note 132. The exact number of eligible voters is not
known. There was no registration process and the last census was held in 1970. Citizens
were permitted to vote in any polling station, simply by presenting their voting certificate.
See Cent. Am. Rep., Apr. 2, 1982, at 97, 98. A little less than 1.2 million ballots were cast
out of an eligible electorate estimated by Anderson to be a little over 2 million people.
Anderson Interview, supra note 132. See also An Election with No Victors, MACLEAN'S, Apr.
12, 1982, at 31; In These Times, Apr. 14-20, 1982, at 5, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 4, 1982, at
A5, col. I; N.Y. Times, June 14, 1982, at A3, col. 1. Note that in the 1977 Salvadoran
presidential election the official national total was a little over 1.2 million ballots cast. S.
WEBRE, supra note 28, at 197 n.21.
139. The provinces of Morazan, Chalatenango, and Cabanas had low voter turnouts.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1982, at A9, col. 1.
140. Anderson Interview, supra note 132; Cent. Am. Rep., Apr. 2, 1982, at 97, 98.
141. The number of null votes was especially high in the capital, where the electorate is
politically more sophisticated. Casting spoiled or blank ballots is a common means of ex-
pressing dissatisfaction with the available candidates. See Boston Globe, Mar. 30, 1982, at
1, col. 4.
142. Though non-voting is a misdemeanor, and a citizen might not be allowed to leave
the country as a penalty, it is doubtful that such sanctions are important in practice. Ander-
son Interview, supra note 132.
143. ECONOMisT, Apr. 3, 1982, at 67; Boston Globe, Mar. 30, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
144. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1982, at Al, col. 6, All, col. 1 (in shantytown of San
Antonio Abad, soldiers dragged residents from homes and beat them, frightening others into
voting); New Haven Journal-Courier, Mar. 29, 1982, at 1, col. 4 (ballot shortages); An Elec-
tion with No Victors, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 12, 1982, at 31 (lost ballots).
145. The ultraviolet lights used to prevent multiple voting by showing indelible ink
marks on voters' fingers did not work. New Haven Journal-Courier, Mar. 29, 1982, at 1, col.
4, 4, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1982, at Al, col. 5.
146. The Christian Democrats (C.D.P.) emerged from the elections winning 24 seats, the
Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) 19 seats, the National Conciliation Party
(P.C.N.) 14 seats, Democratic Action 2 seats, and the Salvadoran People's Party I seat in the
Constituent Assembly. EcoNoMisT, Apr. 3, 1982, at 67; N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1982, § 1, at 10,
col. 1.
147. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1982, at Al, col. 4, A8, col. 3 (interview with Napoleon
Duarte); id., Apr. 3, 1982, at 1, col. 4 (far right vetoes further participation of Duarte in the
government); id, Apr. 10, 1982, at A4, col.3. (Congressmen warn Salvadoran far right on
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creased the role of the far-right parties such as ARENA 148 and
P.C.N.149 in the governing process, and have left unchanged the power
of the main sources of violence and civil strife in the country-the Sal-
vadoran armed forces and security forces. As in the past, the effective
power holders are the military. Ironically, the election results facili-
tated the return to open and active public life of officers and politicians
who were "retired" after the 1979 coup. In fact, these individuals now
control the Constituent Assembly.150 A cashiered officer allegedly
linked to death squads, Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, is the President
of the Assembly and leader of the far-right alliance that possesses
broad powers to organize the government and set the country's legisla-
tive agenda.15 1 The stalled reforms of the junta might be reversed (e.g.,
the nationalization of banks) or slowly undermined (e.g., land re-
form).1 52 Furthermore, the far-right politicians who control the most
important center of civilian politics will offer little, if any, pressure on
or supervision over military conduct in the civil war. Under such cir-
cumstances, increased repression by the government forces against
noncombatant civilians is likely to occur,1 53 and polarization is likely to
accelerate.
The United States is not obliged to provide economic or military
support to any government, and it should not make any commitment to
Christian Democrats' role); Boston Globe, Apr. 24, 1982, at 3, col. 2 (U.S. Ambassador to El
Salvador says aid will continue "whatever the outcome of the government-in-the-making").
148. ARENA (Nationalist Republic Alliance) is a new rightist party led by Maj. Ro-
berto D'Aubuisson, who is widely claimed to have been associated with far-right death
squads.
149. P.C.N. (National Conciliation Party) represents the interests of the traditional alli-
ance of oligarchs and military officers. The P.C.N. ruled El Salvador for 17 years, until the
1979 coup overthrew its last leader, Gen. Humberto Romero.
150. An alliance of the far-right parties (ARENA, P.C.N., Democratic Action, and the
Popular Salvadoran Party) elected Roberto D'Aubuisson to the Presidency of the Constitu-
ent Assembly. Moreover, this coalition shut the Christian Democrats out of the 10-member
directorate of the Assembly. See Boston Globe, Apr. 24, 1982, at 3, col. 2.
However, under pressure from the United States and the military, the Assembly named
Alvargo Magana, an independent, to the provisional presidency. See Wash. Post, Apr. 23,
1982, at Al, col. 1; see also N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1983, § 1, at 11, col. 1. Magana has had
difficulties steering between right and center---to say nothing of the left.
151. The Constituent Assembly has power to name the president, vice-president,
supreme court, and other major officials, and also to review, and perhaps reject the presi-
dent's cabinet and subcabinet appointments. Furthermore, the Assembly has the power to
modify the reform programs enacted by the junta. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1982, at A19, col. 1.
152. For a brief review of policy changes and reversals, the latter often at the instance of
the U.S. in its search for a centrist solution, since the elections, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
1983, § 1, at 11, col. 1.
153. The first reported post-election massacre of noncombatant civilians by the Salvado-
ran government forces resulted in 48 deaths. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1982, at A12, col. 3.
In the last two weeks of May, 12 Christian Democrat officials and activists were murdered,
allegedly by the military authorities. See N.Y. Times, June 1, 1982, at A3, col. 1.
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the victors of an electoral process that is, at best, incomplete. The voter
turnout for the March 28 election, however explained, surely indicated
that the people of El Salvador are weary of war. Unfortunately, con-
trol of the Constituent Assembly by the far right probably will aggra-
vate the crisis and prolong the civil war. Moreover, the interim
government 154 imposed by the armed forces under pressure from the
Reagan administration 155 presents only a facade of national unity to
appease international and U.S. congressional audiences. Because the
parties participating in the elections did not represent center-left polit-
ical opinion, it was unrealistic to assume that a truly representative
(however measured) Constituent Assembly could have resulted. It was
equally unrealistic to assume that any resulting Assembly and interim
government could achieve a political regime whose legitimacy would
force the insurgents to lay down their arms. As long as that substantial
portion of the population represented by the insurgents cannot be or is
not integrated into a democratic El Salvador, no government will
achieve a confident order for coping with the pressing social and eco-
nomic problems confronting the country and region.
VII. Policy Objectives and Recommendations
The principal goals that should orient external decision-makers in
responding to the Salvadoran conflict in a lawful and reasonable fash-
ion are expressed in contemporary international law. These goals are
the maintenance of international peace and security, the minimization
of destructive violence, the facilitation of processes of self-determina-
tion for the peoples in the country concerned, and the protection of
fundamental rights.' 56 Beyond these goals, legitimate widespread in-
terests in the Americas and Europe also should influence responses to
the Salvadoran crisis: containment of the arms race in Central
America, strategic non-alignment expressed as non-dependence on any
one source of military assistance, prevention of major land wars, main-
tenance of open sea lanes and other channels of communications, ac-
cess to scarce resources, non-discrimination in trade and investment,
154. The provisional President, Alvaro Magana, is a banker with graduate economics
training at the University of Chicago. He comes from one of El Salvador's "14 families"
(the traditional oligarchy) and has strong ties to the armed forces. See Wash. Post, Apr. 26,
1982, at A16, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1982, at A7, col. I. As part of the political package
of the interim government, three vice-presidents, one from each major party, were selected.
In order of succession to the presidency, the Christian Democrat representative is last. See
Boston Globe, Apr. 30, 1982, at 57, col. 1.
155. See Wash. Post, Apr. 26, 1982, at A25, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1982, at Al, col.
3; id, Apr. 28, 1982, at A19, col. I; id, Apr. 30, 1982, at Al, col. 2.
156. For background, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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and respect for minimum humanitarian norms. 157
The preceding analysis suggests, however, that the approach of the
Reagan administration to the crisis in El Salvador is unlikely to further
the achievement of these goals and interests. The administration's pol-
icy has two elements, a commitment to assist the Salvadoran govern-
ment in its counterinsurgency efforts, and support for the election of the
Constituent Assembly in March, 1982 as a means of conferring legiti-
macy on the regime. The policy appears based on the assumption that
the government is both willing and able to take steps to end human
rights abuses, to carry out socioeconomic reforms, and to investigate
and initiate prosecutions for the murders of U.S. citizens. 158 But the
government is isolated from the population, and is politically accounta-
ble only to the Salvadoran military, the oligarchy, and the U.S. govern-
ment. The government lacks political legitimacy and skill, and is
incapable of directing a program of reform necessary to economic re-
covery. Military victory seems unattainable, and elections held under
the government's sponsorship are unlikely to produce a peaceful and
comprehensive settlement. Thus, the basic assumptions on which the
administration has built its policy seem ill-founded, and the policy it-
self has little chance to advance objectives sanctioned under interna-
tional law.
The likely failure of the Reagan administration's policy compels a
search for other options that would be more likely to restore peace to El
Salvador and bring an equitable order to the region. A much more
fruitful approach to the crisis would be for the major international ac-
tors interested in the restoration of peace and stability to adhere to a
strict policy of non-intervention in the military conffict, and to pressure
the contestants for power to use techniques sanctioned under interna-
tional law to achieve a settlement. The policy of non-participation
would not ensure immediate cessation of internal strife, but it would
further basic goals of the international community, such as isolation of
the military aspects of the conflict, minimization of destructive vio-
lence, and facilitation of the processes of self-determination. Among
the legal mechanisms that appear most likely to help bring an end to
hostilities are international mediation, and formal recognition of the
opposition.
By sponsoring mediation, international actors can facilitate the polit-
157. See generally U.S. Interest in Latin America, supra note 14.
158. These conclusions contradict the certification that President Reagan provided to
Congress, pursuant to Section 728 of the International Security and Development Coopera-
tion Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, 95 Stat. 1519, 1555 (1981).
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ical-diplomatic process necessary to bring peace to El Salvador. For-
eign governments must press both sides to negotiate a settlement, or, at
least, to negotiate a general framework for achieving a political solu-
tion to the conflict. Although the Organization of American States is
an appropriate forum for these negotiations, informal peace initiatives
outside that body can promote agreement.
A proper framework for international mediation requires the contes-
tants for power in El Salvador to accept certain conditions. Both the
government and the opposition must be willing to begin negotiations
without preconditions. 159 Negotiations must include all active partici-
pants in the internal conflict, including both the F.D.R. and the
F.M.L.N. Direct talks must be held on the principal issues in dispute.
The negotiating parties need to state publicly the general terms of the
proposed settlement, though the specific terms might be suggested only
if such a course would aid in the achievement of a peaceful settlement.
Finally, the parties must show good faith in reaching a legally binding
settlement, however achieved, that would reflect consensus on future
impermissible conduct.
The terms of the settlement should, of course, adhere to the interna-
tional law of the United Nations Charter and other relevant interna-
tional documents. At a minimum, the settlement should mandate no
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, guaranties of basic human rights, self-determination of peo-
ples, and cooperation with third states for social and economic
progress.
An internationally mediated process of dispute resolution of this
character would be facilitated by formal recognition of the F.M.L.N.-
159. On October 7, 1981, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, Coordinator of the Nicaraguan Junta
of National Reconstruction, presented the F.M.L.N.-F.D.R. proposal for finding a political
solution in El Salvador before the United Nations General Assembly. This offer includes a
proposal for talks without preconditions between the Salvadoran opposition and the Salva-
doran Junta. The F.M.L.N.-F.D.R. proposal sought to implement a political solution based
on the following principles:
1. The talks should be carried out between the delegates appointed by the F.M.L.N.-
F.D.R. and the representatives of the Government Junta of El Salvador.
2. They should be carried out in the presence of other governments, that as witnesses
will contribute to the solution of the conflict.
3. The nature of the talks must be comprehensive and include the fundamental as-
pects of the conflict. They must be based on an agenda established by both parties.
4. The Salvadorean people should be informed of the entire process.
5. They should be initiated without pre-established conditions by either party.
F.M.L.N.-F.D.R. Proposal for Finding a Political Solution to the Situation of El Salvador,
reprinted in INFORMATION BULLETIN OF THE POL1TICAL-DIPLOMATIC COMMISSION OF THE
F.M.L.N.-F.D.R., Oct. 16, 1981, at 2. For further background, see CentralAmerica Watch,
233 NATION 429 (1981); Zamora, Saving Salvador, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1982, at A31, col. 3.
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F.D.R. as an insurgent group. First, recognition of the F.M.L.N.-
F.D.R. as insurgents would oblige third parties to consider the war in
El Salvador in their political-diplomatic responses to the situation. It
would focus attention more sharply on the civil war and might reduce
the severity of the conflict by guaranteeing greater adherence to the
laws of war. This recognition would constitute a dejure "international-
ization" of the Salvadoran internal war. Second, recognition by for-
eign governments of a state of insurgency might pressure the
Salvadoran government and the F.M.L.N.-F.D.R. to agree to media-
tion as a means of settling the conflict. Third, were the situation widely
recognized as an insurgency, countries aiding either side in the conflict
would be required to admit explicitly that they are assisting a party to
the conflict, and thus would be pressured to justify their actions. Such
international accountability could elicit more information on the rela-
tive merits of the parties' positions, and might also have a restraining
effect on further foreign participation. Finally, recognition of the
F.M.L.N.-/F.D.R. as insurgents would identify an organized group, in
addition to the government, which could be held responsible for acts
affecting the recognizing state. 60
Given the scope, duration, and intensity of the conffict in El Salva-
dor, there is no doubt that there is an insurgency in the country.161
Thus the recognizing state could not be accused of "premature recogni-
tion," an established instance of illegal interference in the internal af-
160. This recommendation for the recognition of the F.M.L.N.-F.D.R. as an insurgent
group is based on a general policy rationale which Professors W. Michael Reisman and
Eisuke Suzuki have postulated for "every violent political revolt against an established gov-
ernment." Reisman & Suzuki, supra note 6, at 426. Formal recognition of insurgency has
been rare.
161. The situation in El Salvador fulfills the indicia of an insurgency. Insurgency has
been defined as the state of political revolt or insurrection that falls short of civil war, S.
PATEL, RECOGNITION IN THE LAW OF NATIONS 92 (1959), or a twilight zone between rebel-
lion and belligerency, Farer, Foreign Intervention in CivilArmed Conflict, 142 RECUEIL DES
COURs 291, 318 (1974). Some jurists regard any distinction between the recognition of in-
surgency and belligerency as fallacious. See 1 D. O'CoNNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 164-65
(1965). But see H. LAuTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 270-71 (1947).
By mid-March, 1982, the F.M.L.N.-F.D.R. had not yet fulfilled the traditional prerequisites
for recognition as a belligerent. Certain factual conditions are said to be required to permit
a foreign state's recognition of belligerents: a) there must exist within the state an armed
conflict of a general (as distinguished from a purely local) character; b) the insurgents must
occupy and administer a substantial portion of national territory; c) the insurgents must
conduct hostilities in accordance with the rules of war and through organized armed forces
acting under a responsible authority; and d) there must exist circumstances that make it
necessary for outside states to define their attitude by means of recognition of the belliger-
ency. Id. at 176. The F.M.L.N.-F.D.R. has nonetheless made considerable progress toward
isolating the eastern part of the country and consolidating its effective political-military
dominance in the area. If the F.M.L.N.-F.D.R. establishes administrative control over cit-
ies, recognition as a belligerent may be appropriate.
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fairs of another state. 162 Moreover, recognition of the F.M.L.N.-
F.D.R. as insurgents would not entitle it to any form of aid. It would
only signify that the recognizing state considers the insurgents to be
legal contestants for state power, and not simply lawbreakers.
163
The joint Mexican-French declaration on El Salvador, which recog-
nized the F.M.L.N.-F.D.R. as a "representative political force,"' 164
serves many of the same purposes as would formal recognition of the
insurgents, but it has the disadvantages of any innovation in discourse
that has traditionally relied on legal terminology. The more estab-
lished term "insurgents" would also indicate that the F.M.L.N.-F.D.R.
is a legal contestant for power in El Salvador and that the ongoing civil
strife is an object of international concern because of its threat to re-
gional stability. Moreover, while the apparent objective of the joint
statement-to counter U.S. support for the junta's pursuit of a military
rather than a political solution' 65 -is consistent with the goal of world
public order, its terms are impolitic. The call for the restructuring of
the Salvadoran armed forces as a prerequisite to free elections 166 could
not be expected to find support among the military dictatorships of
Latin America.
Whatever objections there may be to any specific formula for media-
tion, there is no practical and helpful alternative to international con-
sultations among foreign allies of the power contenders in El Salvador.
The United States, Western Europe, and other countries or regions
with ties to Central America have an interest in working toward a
peaceful solution to the war in El Salvador. They must bring to bear
diplomatic pressure to develop a structure and procedure for national
162. On "premature recognition," see H. LAUTERPACHT, 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 249-50 (7th ed. 1952).
163. See Higgins, Internal War and International Law, in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 81, 88 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1971).
164. See The Joint Franco-Mexican Declaration on El Salvador, reprinted in INFORMA-
TION BULLETIN OF THE POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC COMMISSION OF THE F.M.L.N.-F.D.R.,
Oct. 16, 1981, at 4. See also Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Sept. 4, 1981, at 1.
Nine Latin American countries, led by Venezuela, protested the Mexican-French joint
statement as an act of intervention in the internal affairs of El Salvador. (The others were
Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and
Colombia. Later Equador, Peru, and Costa Rica also endorsed the protest note.) Latin Am.
Weekly Rep., Sept. 11, 1981, at 1; Guardian, Sept. 2, 1981, at 7.
The Brazilian government has acted cautiously and independently in regard to the Salva-
doran crisis: it has supported neither the U.S. nor the Mexican-French position. It has,
however, opposed any military intervention in El Salvador. See Wash. Post, July 16, 1981,
A29, col. 1, at A30, col. 1; Jornal do Brasil, Sept. 3, 1981, at 12. Brazil remains, therefore, in
good diplomatic position to contribute to international mediation and could, for instance,
offer its good offices as mediator with some chance of acceptance.
165. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1981, at Al, col. 5.
166. Id
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reconstruction in El Salvador that would incorporate the demands of
the F.M.L.N.-F.D.R. and the interests it represents. International me-
diation is no easy task, but in view of the military stalemate in El Sal-
vador and the increased level of destruction, it is a preferable and
lawful alternative to the current stalemate. Once a solution is achieved,
foreign governments could lawfully and effectively provide the assist-
ance necessary for the long-term economic and political reconstruction
of the country.
In conclusion, it must be noted that the effects of the civil war in El
Salvador are not limited to the misery inflicted on the people of that
country alone. The conflict belongs to a larger crisis threatening the
security and stability of the entire Central American region. Tensions
are already running high between Honduras and El Salvador, as refu-
gees from the conflict are settling in Honduras. Claiming that these
refugees are providing aid to the insurgency, the Salvadoran military
has undertaken raids inside Honduras against them. 67 Meanwhile,
clashes are taking place along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border, and
the Sandinista government of Nicaragua is strengthening its armed
forces, and its ties with the Soviet bloc, in anticipation of covert action
and externally supported acts against it.168 The Reagan administra-
tion's regrettable emphasis on a counterinsurgency solution in El Sal-
vador and its support of Honduras only fuels the fears of the
Sandinistas, and further retards the potential for regional economic
growth. 69 The arms race is growing in Central America, and with it
the probability of wider conflict.170 A negotiated political settlement in
El Salvador could mark the first step in defusing this regional security
crisis. Unless Western actors, including European countries, take steps
to mandate a political solution in El Salvador, the Central American
region is unlikely to realize the minimum public order necessary for
mutual security and renewed economic development.
167. REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 166-72; ROWLES, EL CONFLICTO
HONDURAS-EL SALVADOR (1981); N.Y. Times, July 28, 1981, at AS, col. 5.
168. See generaly Landau & Nelson, The C.4. Rides Again, 234 NATION 257, 274-75
(1982); NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 1982, at 26; N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1982, at A18, col. 1; id, Feb.
23, 1982, at A9, col. 1; id, Feb. 15, 1982, at A2, col. 6.
169. See, e.g., Landau & Nelson, supra note 166; 234 NATION 70 (1982); Cent. Am. Rep.,
Feb. 20, 1980, at 49; N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1982, at Al, col. 1; id, Dec. 23, 1981, at Al, col. 3.
170. See Schulz, supra note 125, at 699.
Vol. 8:325, 1982
